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Abstract
The article discusses the possible cost savings of contracting out refuse collection in the
Netherlands. According to foreign econometric studies, contracting out refuse collection
leads to cost savings of approximately 20%. Our findings indicate that similar cost savings
apply to the Netherlands.
However, different production technologies apply to internal or external refuse
collection. The Chow test, which examines whether the estimated coefficients on the
explanatory variables are the same, reveals that different cost functions have to be
estimated for the sub-samples. We show that the postulated cost savings can even be
larger, when taking account of effects of different production technologies.
Though significant cost savings exist on contracting out waste collection,
households will not experience these cost savings on a one to one basis. Private refuse
collection firms must pay VAT while public firms are exempted. At present the Dutch
fiscal system hinders a more pronounced role for private refuse collection firms.1
1. INTRODUCTION
Contracting out tasks like refuse collection, building cleaning, catering and vehicle
maintenance has become an important measure to improve efficiency within the public
sector. There is more and more evidence that contracting out certain public services can
imply an efficient provision of services well adapted to needs and reduces the costs to tax
payers.
In this article, we focus on the effects of contracting out refuse collection. A number
of empirical studies are published on the effects of different institutional forms on
performance in the waste collection market. The studies estimate the effects of private
collection (or contracting out) by estimating a cost function. Generally, these studies
show considerable cost savings, if refuse collection is contracted out .
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Kitchen (1976) estimates a cost decrease of $ 2.23 per capita when private firms
collect household waste with data for 48 Canadian municipalities. Observations of 340
public and private firms in the USA, Stevens (1978) indicate a cost decrease of 7% to 30%
due to contracting out. The magnitude of the effect depends on the size of the municipali-
ty. Domberger et al. (1986) published a study on the effects of contracting out household
refuse collection in the United Kingdom. Making use of a data set with 610 observations
for 305 municipalities, they concluded that there are cost saving of 22% for contracting
out to private companies and 17% for contracting in-house. Szymanski and Wilkins (1993)
and Szymanski (1996) have confirmed the results, based on an extension (in years) of this
UK database.
Though studies are performed for different countries, a study in the Netherlands is
missing. We try to fill the gap and show that results of other studies are confirmed if we
use comparable estimation techniques. Furthermore, we extend these studies in two
directions. First, all cited studies pool observations of waste collection units to estimate
the effects of contracting out. With this pooled data set a cost function is estimated and
the coefficient of the included institutional dummy reveals the effect of different
institutional forms. It is, however, questionable if this pooling is acceptable. Chow (1960)
states that: ￿Often there is no economic rationale in assuming that two relationships are
completely the same￿ (p. 591). In other areas of economics Chow stability tests are used
frequently, see e.g. Apergis et al. (1997), Lai (1994) and Loomis (1989). The most
important application of the Chow stability test is to check for the Lucas critique in time-
series. However, checking for different types of models with cross-sectional databases can
be important as well.
A priori it is not sure if external firms apply the same waste collection technology as
internal firms. External firms handle the collection process from a different perspective
while organisational goals differ. Moreover, differences in municipality size can lead toln C ’ c1 ln Q % c2 ln I % c3 ln D % c4 F % c5 G % c6 P % c7 V % c8 Ei % c9
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different collection techniques. For instance, bigger cities have more opportunities to
make use of scale economies. If collection techniques are not identical, pooling can lead to
biased coefficients. Therefore, if pooling is not justified, different cost functions have to
be estimated for each sub-sample. The omission of the checks on the validity of pooling in
the mentioned studies may lead to biased estimated effects of contracting out on
performance as we will show for the Dutch data. From a policy perspective, it is
important that estimations of possible cost savings are accurate.
Secondly, compared with previous studies more emphasis is put on the fiscal
system. Due to the Dutch fiscal system there is a disincentive for contracting out. Even
though we can estimate significant cost savings when waste collection is contracted out,
households will not experience these cost savings on a one to one basis. In the
Netherlands private collection firms have to pay VAT while public firms are exempt.
Countries such as the United Kingdom and Denmark have a compensating system, in
that local authorities are neutral towards contracting out or in-house production. Thus,
the current fiscal system in the Netherlands renounce the role for private collection firms.
2. EFFECTS OF TENDERING:E STIMATIONS FOR THE NETHERLANDS
Although many foreign econometric studies on effects of contracting out refuse
collection have been published, such estimations are not available in the Netherlands.
This section is an attempt to fill this gap by estimating a cost function for the
Netherlands, making use of a representative data set for Dutch municipalities. To make
the results comparable the applied technique in this section corresponds with the studies
cited in the previous section. The Chow approach is applied in the next section.
2.1 Procedure
On the basis of previous research (see e.g. Stevens, 1978) the following standard
equation is estimated :
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The driving forces behind the total collection cost per municipality (C), include a number
of variables . First, the number of pick-up points (Q) is expected to determine part of the
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total cost. This reflects on the cost which a collection unit has to make by the number of
stops. Secondly, the time spent at the pick-up stop (more sacks or bins) can determine
total cost. These cost are approximated by the number of inhabitants per pick-up point
(I). A third driving force is the time to arrive at the different pick-up points. This is
approximated by the density variable, surface per pick-up point (D). Fourth, the3
frequency of collection (F) is expected to have influence on total collection cost.
Furthermore, the percentage of glass (G), paper (P) and vegetable, fruit and garden waste
(V) separately collected is included in the estimations.
Last, but not least we included a dummy for the institutional form in which waste is
collected (E). Main difference of the institutional form is whether waste is collected by i
the municipality itself or by an external organisation. Within this category we can
discriminate between two types on the basis of ownership, i.e. public and private. Public
external collectors are a combination of municipalities for which waste is collected by an
other municipality and municipalities that formed an independent public organisation.
Given the division of institutional forms, three estimations are made for the whole
sample; one with a dummy for external collection, one with a dummy for private external
collection and one with a dummy for public external collection.
Expected signs are positive for the number of pick-up points, inhabitants per pick-
up point, surface per pick-up point and collection frequency and negative for the
institutional dummy￿s, while signs of the coefficients for the percentage collected glass,
paper and vegetable, fruit and garden waste are undetermined a priori.
2.2 Data
To collect data 120 municipalities were approached in the period November 1996-
April 1997. These municipalities were selected at random from 646 Dutch municipalities.
A total of 85 municipalities have responded to this inquiry , a response rate of 71%. The
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85 municipalities responded to an inquiry on the collection of waste in 1996. The
resulting database was checked on consistency of answers and the reliability was checked
by spot checks on some key answers.
Of the 85 municipalities 41 collect their waste through an external organisation (see
table 1). Of the 41 external firms, 13 were public independent organisations while 3
municipalities collect the waste through an other municipality. The remaining 25
municipalities waste collected the waste through a private collection firm. The data are
representative for the Netherlands in general. Some 30% of the 218 municipalities have a
contract with a private waste collection firm.
Total cost per municipality is measured by multiplying the refuse collection rate(s) by the
total number of households. Total cost is diminished by handling cost by multiplying cost
per ton with tons recycled (glass and paper), composted (vegetable, fruit and garden
waste) and disposed (incineration and dumping).4
Average Maximum Minimum Standard
deviation
Total cost (mln. guilders) 3.5 45.1 0.2 5.6
Pick-up points (number) 16386 267000 400 30618
Inhabitants (per pick-up point) 4.0 64.7 1.6 8.1
Density (km p. pick-up point)
2 11 93 1 15
Frequency (>1/week, dummy) 0.19 1.00 0.00 0.39
Glass (%) 3.2 11.1 0.0 3.0
Paper (%) 6.6 29.7 0.0 7.5
VFG (%) 28.4 47.4 0.0 9.9
External (dummy) 0.48 1.00 0.00 0.50
Private external (dummy) 0.29 1.00 0.00 0.46
Public external (dummy) 0.19 1.00 0.00 0.39
VFG = vegetable, fruit and garden waste.
Table 1. Data estimation cost function, 1996
2.3 Fiscal aspects
A lot of attention has been drawn to the distortionary aspects of taxation (see Atkinson
and Stiglitz, 1980). For the central question in this article taxation can be crucial. The
present fiscal regime distorts the decision process in the Netherlands with respect to
public versus private waste collection. Reason for the distortion is the exemption of VAT
for the public sector and non-profit institutions. Private refuse collection is faced with a
VAT rate of 17,5%, while public organisations are exempted from VAT. Therefore, a
municipality in the Netherlands is biased towards in-house production.
A possibility to resolve this inequality could be to asses public refuse collection as a
business activity and thus tax them with VAT. This policy has been introduced to
enterprise agencies and public utilities such as telecommunications. An other possibility
to alleviate the burden is make provisions to local companies for refuse collection. Since
1972 such a system has been introduced in the United Kingdom. Local authorities that
make any taxable supplies in the course for the furtherance of business are liable to be5
registered for VAT whatever the business of its supplies. For administrative reasons the
list of exempted activities is not exhaustive. Due to this system there is a level playing
field between private and public refuse collectors. From a welfare point of view there
seems to be good reasons to have such a system, because the tax system is neutral.
Denmark has a budgetary system to correct the tax distortion. In the United States this
distortion is not important, because the sales tax is usually levied at the retail level (Davis
and Meyer, 1983). Therefore, this point has not been raised in the reviewed literature in
the previous section.
The difference in fiscal treatment can not be neglected for the Dutch data set for a
proper analysis. In general the municipality cost for private companies are 17,5% higher
compared to public companies. However, the cost for a private company are 17,5% lower
and in this respect the data set has been corrected.
2.4 Results
Results are presented in table 2. The F-statistic shows that all the estimated
equations are significant, while high (adjusted) R ’s indicate that the explained variation is
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high. All coefficients have the expected sign. T-statistics are not corrected for
heteroscedasticity as the White test (White, 1980) could not reject the homoscedasticity
hypothesis for all estimations with 5% confidence.
The number of pick-up points has a significant impact on the total collection cost. A
Wald test of coefficient restrictions (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991) does not falsify the
constant returns to scale hypothesis. This result confirms earlier results from Collins and
Downes (1977) and Hirsch (1965), while Stevens (1978) found also constant returns to
scale for the large cities. Decreasing returns to scale were found by Domberger et al.
(1986) and increasing returns to scale in Szymanski and Wilkins (1993), but coefficients
were very close to one. Kitchen￿s (1976) inverted U-shaped average cost curve result was
not confirmed since inclusion of a quadratic term was falsified with an F-test on 1%
confidence.
The number of inhabitants per pick-up point, the pick-up frequency and the
percentage of collected vegetable, fruit and garden waste have a significant impact on total
cost. If the number of inhabitants per pick-up points increases with 1%, the total cost will
rise with the same percentage. A higher pick-up frequency leads to 19-22% higher cost.
Total cost decrease if more vegetable, fruit and garden waste are collected. It may be due
to a scale effect as vegetable, fruit and garden waste is collected on a one bin per




Pick-up points ln 1.052 1.073 1.080
(20.90) (21.91) (21.57)
Inhabitants per point ln 1.004 1.034 1.037
(12.34) (12.87) (12.55)
Density (km per point)
2 ln 0.009 0.016 0.019
(0.23) (0.39) (0.46)
Frequency dummy 0.174 0.198 0.191
(2.07) (2.35) (2.22)
Glass % 0.019 0.018 0.020
(1.41) (1.29) (1.46)
Paper % -0.008 -0.006 -0.009
(-1.40) (-1.14) (-1.59)
VFG % -0.010 -0.010 -0.013
(-2.26) (-2.10) (-2.84)
Private and public external dummy -0.163 - -
(-2.18)
Private external dummy - -0.136 -
(-1.69)
Public external dummy - - -0.057
(-0.65)
Constant 4.13 3.84 3.84
(6.96) (6.67) (6.39)
R
2 0.93 0.92 0.92
F-value 132.30 128.98 124.71
White (probability homoskedasticity) 0.41 0.21 0.46
Below coefficients are t-statistics. VFG = vegetable, fruit and garden waste.
Table 2. Estimation results Cost functions, 19967
The results for the different institutional forms are of interest. External collection
leads to a 15% lower total cost. A striking result is that private collection is somewhat
more expensive with total cost some 13% lower on average. Given the standard errors
both results are not significant different. However, the other institutional form, collection
by a public external organisation, has no significant influence on total cost. This indicates
that total cost are lower for private compared to other external institutional forms.
Compared to Domberger et al. (1986) and Szymanski (1993) effects of changing
institutional forms are somewhat lower but of the same order. Maybe competition in the
Netherlands is somewhat less stringent since the private firms are not numerous. Private
collection in the Netherlands is controlled by three firms only with some small local
private collection firms.
An important result from our findings is that the difference in fiscal treatment
between private and public ￿firms￿ hampers tendering on the waste collection market .
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Tendering to a private firm will not result in significant effects on tariffs paid by
households. Currently, local governments are free to decide either to collect the waste by
themselves or to tender the job. Incentives to local politicians will therefore not
automatically result in a possible decrease in social cost of waste collection.
3. ROBUSTNESS OF RESULTS
Szymanski and Wilkins (1993) adopted a two-stage approach to control for sample
selection bias. They had two reasons to suspect that sample selection bias could be a
problem for their estimations. First, they estimated a cost function for a data set including
different years while the response rate in 1988 was significant lower than in other years.
This may be due to the introduction of compulsory competitive tendering in that year.
Moreover, they suspected that authorities which performed a successful competitive
tender were certainly keen to report, whereas an inefficient controlled authority did not
likely to report (p. 117). As we do not have an indication that comparable problems exist
in the Netherlands, we assume that sample selection bias is not a problem for our
estimations.
Stevens (1978) tested for the validity of pooling the different municipalities in one
sample. She concluded that different estimations have to be made for a few municipality
size classes, but that pooling of the private and public collection firms was valid. Also
Ganley and Grahl (1988), in a reaction to Domberger et al. (1986), emphasise to make a
difference between urban and rural municipalities, without funding this on econometrics.
Domberger et al. (1988) state in their reply that the included dummy for rural versus
urban municipalities solves this problem. However, they did not check explicitly the8
Breakpoint between rest versus:
No breakpoint hypothesis
F-statistic Probability Conclusion
Public and private external collection 2.98 0.01 breakpoint
Private external collection 1.93 0.07 no breakpoint
Public versus private external collection 1.98 0.03 breakpoints
< 20,000 inhabitants 3.58 0.00 breakpoint
< 40,000 inhabitants 0.30 0.96 no breakpoint
> 20,000 and < 40,000 inhabitants 2.02 0.03 breakpoints
Table 3. Chow breakpoint test cost function Netherlands, 1996
validity of pooling the observations.
Chow (1960) made clear that testing for the validity of pooling observations is
possible (see also Fisher, 1970). As unjust pooling of observations can lead to biased
estimated coefficients this validity check is also necessary. Therefore, we checked the
validity of pooling the observations for the Dutch data set with respect to municipality
size and the different institutional forms, making use of the Chow test .
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Testing for the hypothesis that breakpoints exist with respect to small, mid-size and
large municipalities reveal that this hypothesis can not be rejected (see table 3). The
impossibility to reject the breakpoint hypothesis with respect to municipality size could
be due to the relative inflexible Cobb-Douglas form of the production function.
However, testing for size breakpoints with a more flexible translog form holds the same
conclusions . Moreover, a breakpoint hypothesis with respect to the different institutional
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forms can not be rejected. The probability that no breakpoints exist for all three
organisation forms is less than 5% . This means that different cost functions must be
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estimated for the three institutional forms. For reasons of both types of breakpoints, our
estimates in the previous section could be biased.
Combination of the two different breakpoint tests results in 6 sub-sample estimations. As
our sample includes only 85 municipalities the estimations would become meaningless.
Therefore, we follow a three-step approach. First, we take into account the effects of
pooling the three sub-samples related to institutional form by estimating three equations.
Secondly, we test these equations for the validity of pooling the observations with respect
to municipality size. Third, we make some calculations based on non-parametric methods
to estimate the effect of institutional form on cost.9
Table 4 reveals the effects of sub-sampling on the basis of the different institutional
forms. Comparing the coefficients for the estimated equations clearly reveals that they are
significantly different. Apparently, internal, public and private external waste collectors
have a different production technology. Though coefficients for the number of pick-up
points are not significantly different, for all three institutional forms the constant returns
to scale hypothesis could not be rejected, these results indicate that external firms make
more use of economies of scale. This is not surprising as municipal waste collectors are
bounded on their borders. The number of inhabitants per pick-up point is significant in
the ￿internal￿ equation, while they have no significant effect on the cost of the different
external firms. This applies also for the relative part of vegetable, fruit and garden refuse
in total waste.
We tested the three estimated equations for the validity of pooling the observations
with respect to municipality size, again with a Chow test. Table 5 summarises the results.
Each equation was tested for breakpoints, the number of tests only limited by the number
of observations. Reported is the maximal F-statistic found per equation. For the equations
for private external and internal waste collectors the Chow breakpoint test reveals that
the no-breakpoint hypothesis could not be rejected. Therefore, we conclude that pooling
with respect to municipality size was valid for these cases. Due to the low number of
observations, the equation for public external collectors could not be tested for
breakpoints.
While the samples are now homogenous for institutional form, it is not possible to
include a dummy for this variable in the estimations. Non-parametric comparison
however can give an indication of possible cost differences between the samples. The
estimated equations can be used to predict the development of cost when the institutional
form is changed. Total cost for municipal collectors if they are contracted out can be
predicted with the estimated equation for private collectors, making use of the known
variables for municipal collectors.
Predictions using the estimated equations based on sub-samples confirms the cost
decrease effect of changing the institutional form to a more market related direction.
Contracting out would yield an average cost decrease of 14.8% (see table 6). This indicates
that invalid pooling could underestimate the effect of private collection by 2%. The
underestimation is much greater if we look at the predicted cost decrease if the
institutional form of internal waste collectors is changed to public external. In that case
the estimated cost decrease was 5.5%, while our prediction is 13.9%. Of interest is the
prediction for internalising external firms. Apparently municipalities that collect waste by
means of contracting out have a very good reason for doing that as the predicted average







Pick-up points ln 1.103 1.044 0.964
(15.86) (8.28) (12.21)
Inhabitants per point ln 1.100 -1.333 -2.047
(12.49) (-0.47) (-1.94)
Density (km per point)
2 ln -0.000 0.109 -0.015
(-0.00) (0.87) (-0.16)
Frequency dummy 0.137 0.209 0.109
(1.50) (1.03) (0.34)
Glass % 0.014 -0.017 0.015
(0.67) (-0.64) (0.54)
Paper % -0.004 -0.010 0.002
(-0.49) (-0.96) (0.28)
VFG % -0.012 -0.010 0.004
(-2.13) (-0.91) (0.37)
Constant 3.593 5.265 7.259
(4.59) (3.65) (4.54)
R
2 0.91 0.80 0.98
F-value 61.78 14.52 109.55
White (probability homoskedasticity) 0.22 0.55 0.66
Number of observations 44 25 16
Below coefficients are t-statistics. VFG = vegetable, fruit and garden waste.
Table 4. Estimation results cost functions, different institutional forms, 1996
The essential assumption behind the forecasting procedure is that estimated
coefficients can still be used as the sample is expanded. If municipalities have
characteristics that are very different, predictions can be biased. Therefore, we include
also predictions which take into account that large deviations between predicted and







Private external 19,000 2.17 0.13
Public external n.a. n.a. n.a.
Internal 27,500 1.70 0.14
n.a. Breakpoint test not avaibable for public external collection due to the low
number of observations.
Table 5. Chow breakpoint test cost function, institutional sample, 1996










External ! Internal 17.2 2.0 61.0 51.7
Private ! Internal 19.3 3.7 64.0 55.6
Public ! Internal 14.0 -0.7 56.3 45.5
Internal ! Private -14.8 -9.3 25.0 26.5
Public ! Private 3.4 -5.5 37.5 25.0
Internal
+ public ! Private -9.9 -8.3 28.3 26.1
Internal ! Public -13.9 -8.5 31.8 31.3
Table 6. Estimated cost increases and institutional change
changing in that case, although not surprisingly, the magnitude of the effects is different.
Especially the prediction for internalising is dominated by some observations with high
cost increases. Of interest is the result for internalising public collection firms, since the
sign of the prediction changes. However, it may be due to the low number of
observations in this sub-sample.12
4. CONCLUSIONS
While empirical research on the effects of changes in institutional form on the waste
collection market for the Netherlands is missing, this paper fills in the gap. Our results,
based on generally used techniques, confirm the results of earlier studies, i.e. contracting
out refuse collection results in lower cost.
However, estimations based on the whole sample can be biased. Testing for
breakpoints reveals that waste collectors in smaller, medium and big municipalities have
different production technologies. This also applies for different institutional forms. The
use of the different estimated equations for the sub-samples based on institutional form
reveals that contracting out could have a stronger effect on total cost as presently assumed
in literature. The generally applied techniques therefore underestimates the effect of
contracting out waste collection on cost. In view of the relative low number of
observations, it would be interesting to test these conclusions on a more extensive
database.
The fiscal system in the Netherlands hinders a more profound role for private waste
collection as households will not benefit of the possible cost decreases. The burden of
higher taxes for private firms counteracts the efficiency improvements. A level playing
field would further stimulate the role of private waste collection.13
1. Some studies only compare the average cost for private versus public collection on the basis of
ratio analysis, see e.g. Savas (1977 and 1981) and McDavid (1985) or Data Envelopment
Analysis, see e.g. Cubbin et al. (1987). However, these methods are too simple, because they
fail to account for the effects in changes in other variables. By estimating a cost function,
institutional effects but also other factors as the frequencies of collection, density and the
distance to the nearest disposal site can be taken into account. Therefore, we rely on this
method in this article.
2. Based on a Cobb-Douglas production technique and minimisation of a total cost function.
3. No price variables for the different inputs are included, because no reason exists ex ante why
factor prices would differ between municipalities.
4. In 1996 four municipalities were absorbed by another, 31 municipalities refused to participate
or did not meet the time-schedule.
5. The corrections made because of the difference in tax treatment (17.5%) could be too high as
public collectors can not deduct paid VAT on inputs. This paid VAT is part of the price
consumers pay for the collection of waste. However, inputs with a VAT obligation are very
low in total cost. For example total cost for collection trucks are only about 10% of total
collection cost. This would result in a 1.75% point lower difference in effective VAT rates
between public and private waste collectors. Moreover, the obligation for private firms to pay
profit tax would diminish this difference as capital cost rise.
Regressions with a 1% point lower effective VAT rate for private firms show only very small
differences in coefficients for the institutional dummy￿s. Even a 10% point lower effective
VAT rate for private firms results in a significant cost decrease if waste is collected by an
external firm.
6. Toyoda (1974) and Schmidt and Sickles (1977) showed that the Chow test for equality of
regression coefficients is not robust to heteroscedasticity. Then other tests can be applied (see
e.g. Thursby, 1992) Fortunately, the homoscedasticity hypothesis is not rejected for our
Notes14
estimations.
7. The translog cost function has exactly the number of parameters required for a flexible
functional form, see e.g. Diewert (1987).
8. Although a breakpoint is rejected at the 5% level for private collection versus other
institutional forms, a breakpoint between private collection, public collection and internal
collection could not be rejected.
9. Note that Domberger et al. (1988) also found very large deviations in cost between public and
private collectors.15
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